Tehran sidesteps Islamabad, which then plays ball
At some point, Tehran decided to sidestep
Islamabad by heavily bribing Pakistani
officials and intelligence officers in
Baluchistan to smuggle Rigi out to Iran. An
estimated $10 millions was eventually spent
on this maneuver. But it was money down the
drain; in January, the Pakistani
bribe-takers refused to play ball with
Iran's insistence on its own special forces
going into their territory and grabbing
their quarry just like US special forces
were allowed to operate in Pakistan against
al-Qaeda and Taliban.
2. In the middle of some heavy haggling over
how the wanted man was to be seized and
delivered to Iran, Pakistan's Inter-Service
Intelligence agency, ISI, stepped in with an
offer to hand the Jund Allah leader over to
Iran against Tehran's pledge to refrain from
activating the intelligence and special
operations units it maintains under cover
inside Pakistan, as well as keeping
Pakistan's role in the affair very dark.
The ISI intervened when they saw the
Iranians had been sitting on Rigi's tail for
five months and had discovered his hiding
place near the Pakistani Baluchi capital of
Quetta.
The Iranians accepted the ISI offer.
Saturday and Sunday, February 20-21,
Pakistani intelligence officers passed to
their Iranian colleagues the pertinent
information for monitoring the wanted
Baluchi's movements in Afghanistan and let
them know he was scheduled to land in Dubai
on Tuesday, February 23 en route for
Kyrgyzstan.
Pakistan takes revenge for being excluded
from Afghanistan's future
Islamabad
kept its promise and did not giver the game
away to Washington for three main reasons,
reported by DEBKA-Net-Weekly intelligence
sources:
1. The Pakistanis were bent on preventing
the Americans whisking the Jund Allah leader
and his men to a safe haven to frustrate
their deal with Iran.
2. They too have a stake in immobilizing the
Sunni Jund Allah movement because its
struggle for Baluchi independence embraces
not only the Iranian province but also its
twin in Pakistan. While the ISI would have
preferred to keep Rigi under its watchful
eye inside Pakistan Baluchistan, sending him
away for years as a hostage in an Iranian
prison was seen as good solution for
Islamabad as well.
3. The Pakistanis have a large bone to pick
with the Americans for attempting to cut
them out of diplomacy on the future of
Afghanistan (as mentioned in another part of
this issue). SIS strategists decided that
Islamabad needed to win friends for extra
leverage to outmaneuver US plans for
Afghanistan.
The obvious partner appeared to be Tehran,
which too is excluded from those plans.
With these motives in mind, Pakistani
intelligence strategists went into action to
satisfy Tehran's ambition to catch the Jund
Allah leader, a move which also knocked the
legs out from under the US covert
destabilization effort against the Islamic
Republican regime.